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Legal rules governing the employer-employee relationship are many and varied.  Economic analysis
has illuminated both the efficiency and the effects on employee welfare of such rules, as described
in this paper.  Topics addressed include workplace safety mandates, compensation systems for workplace
injuries, privacy protection in the workplace, employee fringe benefits mandates, targeted mandates
such as medical and family leave, wrongful discharge laws, unemployment insurance systems, minimum









In a modern economy, individuals usually rely on paid work to meet their basic material 
needs.  The present paper is concerned with the economic analysis of laws governing this 
ubiquitous employer-employee relationship.  Such laws have proliferated in both number and 
scope across nations, and economic analysis of these laws’ desirability and effects has 
accordingly attracted significant attention. 
Within a pervasively unionized economy, the body of what is referred to in the United 
States as “labor law” plays an important role in regulating the employer-employee relationship.  
This body of law governs the practices and treatment of labor unions.  In countries with only 
moderate levels of unionization, however, the central responsibility for legal regulation of the 
employer-employee relationship falls to what is referred to in the United States as “employment 
law.”  Employment law governs the treatment of individual employees regardless of their union 
status.  Areas of regulation include workplace safety and privacy, employee fringe benefits, 
workplace leave, job security, and the payment of wages.  The present paper is concerned with 
the economic analysis of these employment law rules. 
An obvious but critical starting point in the economic analysis of employment law is that 
legal regulation of the treatment of employees typically takes place against the backdrop of a 
market relationship.  This market relationship often imposes significant limits on the prospects 
for using employment law purely for the purpose of transferring power, wealth, or other 
entitlements to employees – although employment law is often enacted with such motives as the 
law’s declared purpose.  In the area of mandated leave from employment, for instance, if 
employment law seeks to better employees’ situation by specifying minimum entitlements to 
leave from work, it is possible that the end result will be to worsen employees’ situation as 
wages or employment levels adjust in response to the new legal requirements.  Because of the  
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way in which the market constrains the prospects for using employment law purely to effect 
transfers of resources, the economic analysis of employment law in this paper gives primary 
emphasis to market failures in the employer-employee relationship.  In the presence of a market 
failure, legal intervention through employment law may both enhance efficiency and make 
employees better off.   
This paper situates the major areas of employment law within this market-failure analytic 
framework; importantly, it also identifies certain areas in which legal intervention may help 
targeted employees even in the absence of market failure (sections VI and IX below).  At the 
broadest level, the paper seeks to describe both theoretically and empirically the degree to which 
major forms of legal regulation of the employer-employee relationship may enhance efficiency 
and make employees better off.  Section I of the paper briefly presents the basic framework used 
throughout much of the paper.  Sections II-X consider specific areas of employment law, 
including workplace safety regulation, privacy protection in the workplace, fringe benefits 
mandates, targeted mandates such as medical and family leave, wrongful-discharge laws, 
minimum wage requirements, and rules requiring overtime pay.  A separate chapter of the 
Handbook of Law and Economics (chapter 18, by John Donohue) considers antidiscrimination 
requirements in employment law and other domains such as housing and education.   
 
I.    Framework 
As suggested above, the analysis in this paper rests on the assumption that employment 
law operates to regulate market relationships between employers and employees.  Obviously, it 
is possible to organize an economy in which wages and conditions of employment are set not by  
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private actors in employment markets but instead by a central planner; such non-market settings 
would naturally require a different analysis.   
Within a market setting, when wages and conditions of employment are determined by 
the interaction of labor supply and labor demand, legal intervention not tied to an identified 
market failure will often, although not always, reduce both efficiency and employee welfare 
(section I.A).  However, a number of important market failures may characterize the employer-
employee relationship (section I.B). 
 
A.  Employment law in the absence of market failure 
  Most of the rules of employment law considered in this paper reflect the imposition of a 
legally prescribed term governing the conditions of work into the parties’ employment contract.  
This subsection describes the typical effects of such rules in the absence of market failure.  
Section VI below shows how the analysis differs for rules that target the work conditions of 
discrete, identifiable subgroups of employees.  Note that the framework described here does not 
apply to the rules establishing minimum wage and overtime pay requirements or to the rules 
governing discharge of employees because these forms of legal regulation directly operate on the 
wage or employment level in the regulated employment markets rather than on the conditions of 
work; these forms of legal regulation are covered separately in sections VII - X below. 
In speaking of legally prescribed terms within a contract, it is important to distinguish 
between mandatory and default terms.  Mandatory terms are ones that cannot be changed by the 
parties even if they express a desire to do so.  For instance, if the Occupational Safety and Health 
Act (OSHA), which regulates workplace safety in the United States, requires that a particular 
safety measure be adopted, employers and employees may not avoid the requirement simply by  
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agreeing through contract that it does not apply.  Default terms, by contrast, are terms that apply 
unless the parties reach a contrary agreement.  Most employment law rules are mandatory rules, 
and the analysis to follow assumes that the rule in question is a mandatory one.  The specific 
employment law rules discussed in the reminder of this paper are all mandatory ones. 
  The legally prescribed terms that employment law specifies for the employer-employee 
relationship typically require employers to provide something of value – a safer workplace; 
privacy; certain fringe benefits; leaves from work in specified circumstances – to employees.  
Accordingly, within a simple labor supply and demand framework with no market failure of any 
sort, these rules will produce a downward shift in the labor supply curve by the amount of the 
value of the mandated benefit and a downward shift in the labor demand curve by the amount of 
the cost of the mandated benefit (Summers 1989).  These effects are depicted graphically in 
Figure 1.   
Within this simple framework, it is obvious that the effects of a particular employment 
law rule on efficiency and employee welfare turn on the relative magnitude of the labor supply 
and labor demand shifts.  If the downward shift in the labor supply curve (S° to S' in Figure 1) is 
less than the downward shift in the labor demand curve, then the wage will fall by more than the 
value of the legally mandated benefit to employees in the employment market in question, and 
employment (and, with it, efficiency and employee welfare) will fall (Figure 1, top panel).  If, by 
contrast, the downward shift in the labor supply curve is larger than the downward shift in the 
labor demand curve, then the wage will fall by less than the value of the legally mandated benefit 
to employees, and employment (and with it, efficiency and employee welfare) will rise (Figure 1,  
 
5 
                                                
bottom panel).  But if that were the case, then, given the assumed lack of any form of market 
failure, employers would have offered the benefit without any need for a legal mandate.
1  
Thus, in the absence of market failure, employment law rules will generally reduce both 
efficiency and employee welfare.  However, employment markets may fail for a variety of 
reasons.  Section I.B below describes the most commonly discussed market failures in the 
employer-employee relationship. 
 
B.  Market failures in the employer-employee relationship 
As described above, market failures provide an organizing paradigm for the analysis of 
many major areas of employment law.  A number of market failures may occur in the employer-
employee relationship, as described below. 
 
1. Information  failures 
  Of central importance in the employment setting are possible information failures. 
Information failures occur when some market participants lack information that bears upon their 
decisions in that market.  In employer-employee relationships, both parties may suffer from 





1 This analysis assumes that there is no binding legally specified minimum wage in the employment 
market in question.  At least in the United States, the minimum wage is sufficiently low in most 
jurisdictions that it is not binding in most employment markets.  With a binding minimum wage (meaning 
the market wage is near or below the legally prescribed minimum wage) the effects of legally mandated 
terms would be felt in employment levels rather than wages.  
 
6 
  a.  Employee-side information failures 
  Some aspects of the employment relationship are likely to be relatively transparent to 
employees.  Wages, for instance, are an aspect of the relationship about which employees will 
usually have good information.  By contrast, the magnitude of the risk of long-term occupational 
disease is something about which employees will often not be well informed. 
  Employee-side information failures may be modeled in two distinct ways.  One 
possibility is that employees with limited information are aware of their informational limits and 
take rational steps in response to those limits.  As described below, this type of modeling 
assumption is often adopted in analyzing employer-side information failures.  A second 
possibility is that employees with limited information either are not aware of their informational 
limits or do not change their behavior in response to such awareness.  This is the usual modeling 
assumption adopted in analyzing employee-side information failures and is the assumption used 
in this paper for analyzing such information failures. 
  If employees are unaware of some aspect of the employment relationship that would 
affect their willingness to supply labor, then observed labor supply will differ from employees’ 
“true” willingness to supply labor.  In the case of workplace safety, for instance, employees may 
lack adequate information about risks and harms and, as a result, may oversupply labor at a given 
wage rate.  In terms of Figure 1 above, the labor supply curve is shifted toward S', and 
employees behave as if their workplace were covered by an employment term fostering safety 
even though it is not.  In such cases, the information failure means that some transactions that 
take place are inefficient – because the cost of supplying labor (measured by S° in Figure 1) in 
these transactions exceeds the marginal revenue product of labor (measured by D°); it also means 
that employees are worse off than they would be in a well-functioning market – because they are  
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engaging in some transactions in which the cost of supplying labor exceeds the wage they earn.  
Employee-side information failures are discussed further in sections II (workplace safety) and IV 
(workplace privacy) below. 
 
b.  Employer-side information failures 
Employers will frequently have only imperfect information about the attributes of their 
employees.  This is particularly likely to be true at the point of hiring but may be true later on as 
well.  A large literature in labor economics examines the consequences of such employer-side 
imperfect information for labor markets (e.g. Greenwald 1986; Gibbons and Katz 1991). 
As noted above, the usual modeling assumption in the case of an employer-side 
information failure is that employers are aware of the limits on their information and respond 
rationally to these limits.  Thus, the employers’ information problem is typically modeled as a 
situation of adverse selection.  Employer-side information failures and the resulting adverse 
selection problems are discussed further in sections V (fringe benefits mandates) and VII 
(wrongful discharge law) below. 
 
2. Monopsony 
  A second failure in employment markets is monopsony power.  (Because this paper is 
focused on employment law rules that protect employees and does not examine labor law, the 
paper does not discuss the alternative scenario of market power or monopoly on the employee 
side.)  If an employer is a monopsonist in the market for a particular type of employee, then 
instead of taking the wage as given as in a competitive labor market, the individual employer 
will face an upward-slowing labor supply curve.  This employer will choose its employment  
 
8 
level E to maximize R(E) – w(E)E, where R(E) is the employer’s revenue and w(E) is the labor 
supply curve.  Under the associated first-order condition for the employer, it is clear that the 
wage under monopsony falls short of the marginal revenue product of labor R′(E).  This outcome 
is inefficient, as well as detrimental to employee welfare, because some employees who would 
produce more value than the cost of their labor are not hired.  Section IX below notes the 
familiar argument that minimum wage laws may respond to such monopsony-based market 




A third potential failure in employment markets arises from the external effects of some 
decisions by market participants.  If, for instance, an employee is killed or injured on the job, it is 
not only the employee (and possibly employer) who may suffer harm.  Family members will 
typically suffer, though employees may usually take such effects into account.  Systems of social 
support will often be affected as well.  Although externalities are obviously a classic form of 
market failure, they have received less attention than information failures and monopsony in the 
existing literature on the economics of employment law and, thus, receive relatively limited 
attention below.  
 
4.  Employee-side cognitive bias 
Information failures, market power, and externalities are the traditional forms of market 
failure within conventional economic analysis.  A separate set of potential market failures,  
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however, arises from the possibility that employees will exhibit distorted labor supply decisions 
as a result of various forms of cognitive bias. 
Of natural relevance to employment law is a substantial literature showing that many 
individuals exhibit optimism bias, adjudging their personal probability of facing bad outcomes to 
be lower than the average probability of facing such outcomes (Weinstein 1980).  Many people, 
for instance, believe that their chances of having an auto accident are significantly lower than the 
average person’s chances of experiencing this event (DeJoy 1989), although of course these 
beliefs cannot all be correct, for if everyone were below “average,” then the average would be 
lower.  There is also evidence that people underestimate their absolute as well as relative (to 
other individuals) probability of experiencing negative events such as auto accidents (Arnould 
and Grabowski 1981:34-35; Camerer and Kunreuther 1989:566).  
From a modeling standpoint, optimism bias among employees is similar to the employee-
side information failures discussed in section I.B.1 above.  Parallel to the case of such 
information failures, the most natural assumption, and the one that will be utilized in this paper, 
is that employees with optimism bias either are not aware of the bias or do not change their 
behavior in response to the bias.
2  Thus, as with information failures, if employees exhibit 
optimism bias in relation to some aspect of the employment relationship that affects their 
willingness to supply labor, then observed labor supply will differ from employees’ true 
willingness to supply labor.  In the case of workplace safety, for instance, optimism bias may 
lead even employees who have full information about the general risks and harms in their 
workplace to underestimate the probability that they personally will experience negative 
 
2 Akerlof and Dickens (1982), by contrast, analyze workplace safety under the assumption that employees 
are aware of their tendency to believe (in Akerlof and Dickens’s model, because of cognitive dissonance) 
that the workplace is safer than it is.  Because of such awareness, employees in their model take action in 
response to their biased tendencies.  
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outcomes, and, as a result, they may oversupply labor.  The effects of this were discussed in 
section I.B.1 above.  Optimism bias is discussed further in sections II (workplace safety) and IV 
(workplace privacy) below. 
 
II. Workplace  Safety  Mandates 
  This section and the sections that follow analyze the major forms of legal regulation of 
the employer-employee relationship, beginning with the legal regulation of workplace safety.  A 
few of the topics included in the sections to follow are already treated in some depth in the 
Handbook of Labor Economics or the Handbook of Public Economics and, thus, are mentioned 
only briefly here, with cross-references to the longer treatments in the existing Handbook 
volumes.
3  Throughout, work published in law review, as opposed to economics journal, format 
is described at greater length, on the theory that the typical degree of background and detailed 
exposition provided in a law review article creates a form of barrier to entry that is not present 
when reference is made to work published in economics journal format. 
Because many individuals spend a substantial fraction of their waking hours at work and 
often encounter risks in the course of work, workplace safety is a central issue of public policy.  
Many features of employment law are concerned with enhancing workplace safety.  Legal 
regulation in this area includes both direct mandates of safe work conditions, as under the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) in the United States, and indirect channels for 
 
3 In areas not already covered in other Handbook chapters, the treatment offered below seeks to describe 
and synthesize the most influential economic analyses in each major area of employment law, rather than 
to catalogue in a comprehensive manner all existing economic analyses in each area.  
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improving workplace safety through the employer incentives created by mandated compensation 
for workplace injuries.  This section and section III consider these two basic approaches in turn.
4  
The general starting point for economic analysis of workplace safety regulation is the 
observation that in the absence of market failure, less safe working conditions should be fully 
compensated by higher wages – an application of the theory of equalizing wage differentials.
5  
Viscusi (1978) and Viscusi and O’Connor (1984), among others, present evidence of adjustments 
in wages in response to workplace risks.  The evidence on risk-based adjustments in wages, 
however, is limited in two important ways.  First, without some independent way of monetizing 
the cost of a higher-risk job, at most the empirical evidence can tell us that wages move in a 
particular direction in relation to risk; it cannot tell us whether wages adjust by the right amount 
(given the employee’s underlying preferences) in light of workplace risks.   Movement in one 
direction or the other is ultimately a fairly weak test of the theory of equalizing wage 
differentials.  The second limitation is that sources of credible identification of empirical effects 
are extremely difficult to find in this area because employees who select into different types of 
jobs with different levels of associated risk may differ along important dimensions that are not 
observed by the analyst; and moreover, the jobs into which employees select may also differ 
along dimensions that are not observed by the analyst.  If either individual or job characteristics 
that are unobservable by the analyst are correlated with job risks, then correlations between risks 
and wages may be entirely spurious.  Employment law, not satisfied that equalizing wage 
 
4 In addition to workplace safety mandates and mandated compensation for workplace injuries, general 
tort law may have some effect on workplace safety incentives; however, such effects are limited by the 
fact that, at least in the United States, workers’ compensation (discussed in section III) preempts most tort 
liability for workplace injuries.  See chapter 2, by Steven Shavell, in this Handbook for further discussion 
of the economic analysis of tort law. 
5 Brown (1980) offers a general treatment of the topic of equalizing wage differentials.  
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differentials fully address the issue of workplace safety, has chosen to regulate workplace safety 
in both the direct and indirect ways noted above. 
 
A.  Theoretical analysis of workplace safety mandates   
The most direct form of workplace safety regulation is workplace safety mandates.  
These mandates require particular workplace practices intended to enhance workplace safety.  In 
the United States, as previously noted, OSHA imposes a range of such mandates, which are 
described in detail in Smith (1976) and Mendeloff (1979).   
Within economic analysis, workplace safety mandates are typically justified on the 
ground that either information failures or optimism bias on the part of employees leads them to 
oversupply labor at a given wage rate.  Frequently employees will not be aware of the risks of a 
particular workplace, and even employees who have good information about the general risks of 
their workplace may overoptimistically assume that those risks do not apply to them personally.   
As noted in section I.B above, an oversupply of labor because of information failures, 
optimism bias, or both means that some inefficient transactions are taking place and that 
employees are worse off than they would be in a well-functioning market.  Workplace injuries 
may also have important externality effects, but the informational and cognitive problems have 
been central in the existing literature.  In the presence of such problems, workplace safety 
mandates can in theory improve both efficiency and employee welfare by eliminating the 
inefficient and detrimental (to employees) transactions described in section I.B.  If observed 
labor supply under a mandate matches the “true” willingness to supply labor (because the 
workplace is safe, consistent with employees’ belief), then only efficient transactions will occur, 
and employees will accept employment only to the extent that the wage equals or exceeds their  
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“true” cost of supplying labor.  Of course, in the real world the mandated levels of workplace 
safety may not match employees’ beliefs or may be exorbitantly expensive; responding to even a 
genuine employee-side informational or cognitive problem does not guarantee that efficiency 
and employee welfare will rise under a workplace safety mandate.  Ultimately, the effects of a 
workplace safety mandate are an empirical question.
6 
 
B.  Empirical analysis of workplace safety mandates 
As just noted, the central question about workplace safety mandates concerns their 
empirical effects on wages, employment levels, and, of course, workplace safety.  A large 
empirical literature has attempted to identify such effects.
7  This literature has focused on 
workplace injuries (in the sense of immediate negative health effects), as distinguished from 
longer-term health risks from work; this focus is reflected in the discussion below.  As the 
discussion below will make clear, the overall body of empirical evidence suggests modest (at 
best) effects of workplace safety mandates on observed levels of workplace safety, and, 
presumably because of the limited evidence of effects on the basic level of workplace safety, 
wage and employment effects of workplace safety mandates have generally not been studied.  
Most of the empirical evidence on the effects of workplace safety mandates comes from the 
United States, and that focus is reflected in the discussion below. 
In sharp contrast to the workplace injury compensation systems noted in section III 
below, workplace safety mandates in the United States operate at the federal level, and, as a 
 
6 Not addressed in this discussion is the possibility that workplace safety mandates may affect the degree 
of precautionary behavior by employees.  Rea (1981) offers related discussion, although his analysis is 
primarily focused on compensation systems for workplace injuries (the topic of the next section) rather 
than on workplace safety mandates. 
7 For a comprehensive survey of this literature through the early 1990s, see Smith (1992).  
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result of OSHA’s status as a federal law, state law variation generally cannot be used to identify 
OSHA’s effects.
8  Limited exceptions to this statement about OSHA are Ruser and Smith (1988) 
and Morantz (2005).  Ruser and Smith examine the effects of the initiation of a records-check 
procedure in some but not all states on the level of reported workplace injuries; they find a lower 
level of reported injuries with the records-check procedure in place, but they are unable to 
determine from their data whether this results from a true reduction in injury rates or (the 
interpretation they emphasize) an increase in the frequency of underreporting because under the 
records-check procedure underreporting would reduce the likelihood of costly safety inspections.  
Ruser and Smith’s study is largely concerned with effects on reporting levels rather than the 
more basic issue of effects on workplace safety.  Meanwhile, Morantz’s (2005) work examines 
how injury rates among construction workers vary with federal versus state enforcement of 
OSHA’s substantive provisions and finds significantly lower injury rates in states with federal 
enforcement.  Although the injury rate data do not go back far enough to allow Morantz to 
examine changes over time with the move from federal to state enforcement (so that, in contrast 
to Ruser and Smith, identification is based on cross-state variation only, rather than variation 
across both states and time), Morantz’s empirical approach does attempt to control 
comprehensively for other cross-state differences, apart from federal versus state enforcement, 
that could be influencing injury rates. 
 
8 Much empirical work in employment law, including the work described in several of the sections below 
as well as much work in the employment discrimination area (e.g., Neumark and Stock 1999; Jolls 2004a; 
Jolls and Prescott 2006), exploits variation in legal innovation across states to identify the effects of legal 
rules.  With change over time but no cross-state variation – as with a federal law such as OSHA – it is 
often difficult to disentangle the effects of the law’s enactment from other unobserved changes occurring 
at the same time.  Indeed, as Smith (1992) notes, even a simple national-level before-after comparison of 
injury rates in relation to OSHA’s enactment is not possible because OSHA significantly changed the 
manner of collecting data on workplace safety.  
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Other empirical work on OSHA has examined variation in its enforcement over time or 
across industries (rather than across states) as a source of identification of the law’s effects on 
workplace safety.  In light of the low financial penalties for the typical OSHA violation and the 
low likelihood of OSHA inspections (Viscusi 1979; Weil 1996), many have questioned whether 
OSHA is likely to have any effect on workplace safety at all, regardless of variation in 
enforcement within the low observed ranges of penalties and inspection frequencies.  Viscusi 
(1979) and Bartel and Thomas (1985), for instance, find limited or no relationship between 
measures of OSHA enforcement and injury rates, while Viscusi (1986) finds at best a modest 
relationship.
9   
Scholz and Gray (1990) have suggested, however, that the limited effects of OSHA on 
injury rates in many empirical studies reflect the overly generalized approach of these studies.  
Scholz and Gray focus on the firms most likely to be affected by OSHA – large, frequently 
inspected firms – and find significant effects of OSHA enforcement on injury rates in their 
sample.  Unlike earlier studies, Scholz and Gray’s study uses plant-level rather than industry-
level data on OSHA enforcement levels and injury rates.  However, a recent study by Gray and 
Mendeloff (2005) using a methodology similar to that in Scholz and Gray (1990) found that the 
significant effects of OSHA on injury rates lasted only through the early 1990s and were not 
apparent in data for most of the 1990s. 
While the central variable of policy interest in studying OSHA’s effects is the workplace 
injury rate, several studies have examined the relationship between the level of OSHA 
enforcement and the degree of firms’ observed compliance with OSHA’s requirements.  Bartel 
and Thomas (1985) and Weil (1996), for instance, find evidence of significant effects of 
 
9 See Viscusi (1983) for discussion of additional studies of OSHA’s effects on injury rates from the 
period just after OSHA’s enactment.  
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enforcement on compliance with OSHA’s requirements, notwithstanding the general evidence, 
noted above, of very limited levels of OSHA enforcement.  By contrast, Weil (2001) finds only 
limited effects of enforcement activity on compliance in the construction industry. 
Ultimately, the existing empirical work provides relatively little evidence of effects of 
OSHA on injury rates, with slightly more evidence of compliance effects.  The lack of variation 
across states has, not surprisingly, impeded efforts to pin down the effects of OSHA’s workplace 
safety mandates more definitively.  Although the theory suggesting the likelihood of market 
failure in the workplace safety context seems strong, direct empirical evidence on the effects of 
OSHA has, at least thus far, not provided a clear basis for concluding that this law has enhanced 
efficiency and employee welfare or, even more basically, that the law has decreased workplace 
injuries.  As described below, the empirical picture on compensation systems for workplace 
injuries – the other major employment law mechanism for improving workplace safety – is at 
least somewhat more positive. 
 
III. Compensation  Systems for Workplace Injuries 
Employment law seeks to enhance workplace safety not only through direct safety 
mandates, as under OSHA, but also through the deterrent effects afforded by legally mandated 
systems of compensation for those injured on the job.  In the United States, state workers’ 
compensation programs are a major source of such legally-mandated compensation.  Injured 
workers in the United States may also be eligible for compensation through the federal disability 
insurance program, but the absence of any experience-rating component in this program means 
that it does not create any particular deterrent effects for employers.  The disability insurance 
program, which is funded through compulsory payroll deductions by employers, is nonetheless a  
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significant additional source of compensation for employees injured at work and, thus, is usually 
included in analyses of compensation systems for workplace injuries.   
Both the theory and the empirical evidence relating to workers’ compensation systems 
are developed in chapter 33 (by Krueger and Meyer) of the Handbook of Public Economics, and 
the federal disability insurance program is also extensively discussed in that chapter; thus the 
reader is referred to Krueger and Meyer’s treatment for further discussion of the economic 
analysis of these programs.  In brief, Krueger and Meyer conclude that the empirical evidence 
suggests longer periods out of work with more generous workers’ compensation benefits (a 
finding with ambiguous welfare consequences, as noted by Krueger and Meyer); they also note 
the work by Gruber and Krueger (1991) suggesting no statistically significant reduction in 
aggregate employment levels from increases in the generosity of workers’ compensation 
programs (a finding suggestive of the absence of significant welfare costs from these programs, 
although not of affirmative efficiency gains from the programs).  Meanwhile, with respect to the 
federal disability insurance program, Krueger and Meyer emphasize the unresolved question of 
what causes the observed major changes in the size of the population receiving federal disability 
insurance payments, a topic of ongoing research (e.g., Autor and Duggan 2003). 
 
IV. Workplace  Privacy  Mandates 
A very rapidly growing area of employment law – particularly with the increasing 
presence of computers and the associated monitoring possibilities in the workplace – is 
workplace privacy.  Issues of workplace privacy span a broad array of domains.  Questions 
include the degree to which employers may videotape or audiotape their employees’ activities in 
the workplace, the restrictions (if any) on drug and alcohol testing of employees, the degree to  
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which employers may engage in various forms of monitoring of employees’ activities on 
computers, and the limits on employers’ disclosure of medical and other personal information 
about employees.  Workplace privacy mandates require employers to conduct activities of this 
sort in specified ways, if at all.  This section briefly highlights the central issues in the economic 
analysis of such workplace privacy mandates. 
 
A.  Theoretical analysis of workplace privacy mandates 
From an economic standpoint, the possible market failures in the workplace privacy 
setting parallel the main potential market failures in the workplace safety context.  One potential 
market failure is an employee-side information failure; for some forms of privacy-related 
employer behavior, the employee may simply have no idea that the behavior is occurring.  
Employees may assume that their privacy is protected at work, just as they may assume that their 
workplace is safe.  Examples in the privacy context include video or audio monitoring and the 
monitoring of employees’ computers – practices of which employees may be entirely unaware.  
In other settings, by contrast, an employee may know when a particular invasion of privacy 
occurs; an example is urine testing for drug use – an employer practice that obviously cannot be 
done without the employee’s knowledge. 
Even employees who have accurate information about an employer’s general practices in 
relation to workplace privacy may be led by optimism bias to underestimate the likelihood that 
the at-issue employer behavior will be undertaken in relation to, or have a negative effect upon, 
them as opposed to other employees.  The analysis is again parallel to the workplace safety 
context, in which employees may underestimate their personal likelihood of workplace risks.  
Note that in the workplace privacy context, the risks of market failure related to optimism bias  
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will tend to be greater when there is more uncertainty in the employer’s policy.  For instance, 
employees may underestimate the likelihood that they will be subjected to a drug test under an 
employer policy permitting drug testing of employees involved in a workplace accident, simply 
because employees may tend to underestimate the likelihood that they will be involved in such 
an accident.  By contrast, if an employer policy provides that employees will be subjected to 
ongoing video or audio monitoring as a matter of course, then optimism bias is likely to be less 
important – though optimistically biased employees could still underestimate the likelihood that 
the monitoring will detect a prohibited behavior on their part.   
Parallel to the discussion of workplace safety in section II.A above, a workplace privacy 
mandate may address an employee-side information failure or cognitive bias by eliminating the 
gap between observed labor supply and the “true” willingness to supply labor (because privacy is 
now protected at the workplace, consistent with employees’ expectation).  Of course, as above, 
whether any given workplace privacy mandate actually has positive effects on efficiency and 
employee welfare is ultimately an empirical question. 
 
B.  Empirical analysis of workplace privacy mandates 
Very little empirical evidence currently exists on the effects of workplace privacy 
mandates.  However, in the case of the United States, the existence of variation in these 
mandates across states and time suggests the potential value of empirical inquiry in this area.  
Whether wages and employment levels would ever move to a discernible degree in response to 
workplace privacy mandates is unclear, but effects on observable outcomes other than wages and 
employment levels may be easier to detect.  Jacobson (2003), for instance, presents evidence of 
better safety outcomes in safety-sensitive occupations in states that enacted legislation clarifying  
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the permissibility of drug testing for safety-sensitive positions than in states that did not enact 
such legislation.  There is some suggestion of preexisting trends in the enacting states, so the 
results should be viewed with some caution, but Jacobson also finds improved safety outcomes 
after the imposition of federally mandated drug testing for certain safety-sensitive positions.  
Jacobson’s findings suggest that some forms of workplace privacy mandates (especially in the 
drug testing context) may have the unfortunate effect of worsening safety outcomes.  Additional 
empirical work on the effects of workplace privacy mandates is likely to appear as these 
mandates become increasingly common.   
 
V.  Fringe Benefits Mandates  
  Employers may be responsible not only for improved workplace conditions – including 
safety and privacy – but also for the provision of important fringe benefits.  Fringe benefits are 
usually understood to include such benefits as health insurance and pensions.  The present 
section focuses on the legal regulation of health insurance, the great majority of which is 
provided through the employment relationship (although this is less true outside the United 
States).  Pension-related mandates are not considered in this paper because there is very little 
existing literature on the effects of such mandates on wages, employment levels, or other labor 
market outcomes.
10  
With respect to health insurance mandates, the Medicare program in the United States 
requires compulsory payroll deductions by employers and offers government-provided health 
 
10    The central law governing pensions in the United States is the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act, a federal law that broadly displaces potential state-level regulation of pensions and, thus, leaves little 
opportunity for credible identification (through state-level variation in legal innovation) of the effects of 
legal regulation of pensions.  See Ippolito (1988) for further discussion of the effects of the pension-
related mandates imposed at the federal level.  
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insurance to (primarily) retirement-aged individuals.  Under this program, individuals see a 
deduction from their paychecks during their working years and then are entitled to health 
insurance financed by the federal government during their retirement.
11  The Medicare system is 
discussed in chapter 50 (by Currie and Madrian) of the Handbook of Labor Economics and 
chapter 31 (by Cutler) of the Handbook of Public Economics, and the reader is referred to those 
volumes for further discussion of this system.  Because the Medicare system is covered in those 
volumes, the focus of the present section is other types of health insurance mandates. 
Both federal and state law in the United States play a role in structuring the system of 
health insurance mandates considered in this section.  The federal role here is two-fold.  First, the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) broadly “preempts,” or renders 
inapplicable, all state-level health insurance mandates insofar as employer-provided health 
insurance is concerned, unless the employer-provided insurance is procured from an insurance 
company.  Thus, any employer that self-insures – as many now do – is not subject to any health 
insurance mandates imposed at the state level.  Second, federal law imposes a few limited 
mandates on health insurance plans.  One such mandate is contained in the Consolidated 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA), which requires that, above a certain employer-
size threshold, employees be allowed to continue purchasing health insurance through their 
former employer for up to 18 months after leaving that employer.  A second source of federal 
health insurance mandates is the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), 
 
11  By contrast, the Medicaid program in the United States is targeted to the needy and is not linked to the 
employment relationship in any way.   
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which imposes a variety of requirements on employers and other health insurance providers, 
including mandated coverage for preexisting conditions.
12   
State-level health insurance mandates, to the extent that their application is not preempted 
by ERISA, also impose a variety of requirements on health insurance plans; for instance, some 
state laws impose continuation coverage mandates similar to the mandate in COBRA (see 
Gruber and Madrian 1994).  State-level regulation is discussed briefly below where its mandates 
overlap with federal requirements, but, because of the preemption issue noted above, the focus of 
this section is on federal health insurance mandates.
13 
 
A.  Theoretical analysis of fringe benefits mandates 
Several potential market failures, including employee-side information failures and 
cognitive biases, may be relevant to analysis of the health insurance mandates noted just above, 
but perhaps the most obvious labor market failure in this context involves employer-side 
imperfect information.  (For discussion of the broader issue of provision of health insurance 
through, rather than independently of, the employment relationship, see chapter 50 (by Currie 
and Madrian) of the Handbook of Labor Economics.)  For instance, an individual employer 
opting unilaterally to offer continuation coverage of the sort required by COBRA might 
disproportionately attract employees who are less likely to remain employed (especially those 
who simultaneously have concerns about their future health) and, thus, who are particularly 
 
12 Moreover, recently enacted HIPAA regulations impose a series of privacy-related requirements on 
employers concerning the disclosure of medical information; those requirements may be analyzed under 
the framework set forth in section IV (workplace privacy) above.  An additional federal law regulating 
health insurance is the Mental Health Parity Act.  For the reasons given in section VI below, this law is 
best viewed as a targeted mandate and, thus, is discussed in section VI rather than here.   
13 Economic analyses of the effects of various state-level health insurance mandates include Gruber 
(1994b), Kaestner and Simon (2002), and Simon (2005).  Chapter 31 (by Cutler) in the Handbook of 
Public Economics also contains discussion of these mandates.  
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focused on the issue of continuation coverage.  In broad terms, the problem of adverse selection 
here is similar to the problem – described in detail in section VII.A below – faced by an 
individual employer opting to offer protection against discharge from employment without just 
cause.  In both cases, offering the benefit may make the employer disproportionately attractive to 
less desirable employees.
14 
In the health insurance context, if the value to employees of a particular form of health 
insurance coverage (such as continuation coverage) exceeds the cost of providing such coverage, 
then mandating such coverage may efficiently respond to the adverse selection problem just 
described.  Of course, in the case of continuation coverage, employers in an ideal world might 
offer not this type of coverage but, instead, employee-specific packages of wages and health 
insurance tailored to each employee’s individual costs and needs (Gruber and Madrian 1994).  
However, as Gruber and Madrian note, the barriers to such an approach – whether achieved 
voluntarily or through legal regulation – in the real world are clear, and thus mandated 
continuation coverage, as under COBRA, may be a good second-best solution.  Empirical 
evidence on the effects of both mandated continuation coverage and mandated coverage for 
preexisting conditions is noted in the next section. 
 
B.  Empirical analysis of fringe benefits mandates 
Empirical evidence on the effects of continuation coverage mandates on a variety of 
employment-related outcomes is discussed in chapter 50 (by Currie and Madrian) of the 
Handbook of Labor Economics; the discussion there of the studies by Gruber and Madrian 
(1994, 1995, 1996, 1997) of both COBRA and state-level continuation coverage mandates is 
 
14 Aghion and Hermalin (1990) offer general discussion of the problem of adverse selection in employer-
employee and other contracting releationships.  
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especially relevant.  On balance, continuation coverage mandates appear to increase both 
separation and retirement from work by employees; effects on overall wage and employment 
levels (which would permit conclusions about the welfare effects of continuation coverage 
mandates) presumably were not large enough to be studied empirically. 
With respect to preexisting conditions coverage mandates, chapter 31 (by Cutler) of the 
Handbook of Public Economics discusses the effects of various state-level health insurance 
mandates, including preexisting condition coverage mandates, on health insurance coverage 
rates.  In addition, in the time since this volume of the Handbook of Public Economics was 
published, studies by Kaestner and Simon (2002) and Simon (2005) have also examined the 
effects of state-level health insurance mandates, including preexisting condition coverage 
mandates, while recent work by Sanz-de-Galdeano (2006) studies the effects of HIPAA, which 
(as noted above) includes a preexisting conditions coverage mandate.  The body of existing 
empirical work suggests that these mandates have limited or no effects on insurance coverage 
rates, wage and employment levels, or other outcomes.
15  
 
VI. Targeted  Mandates 
  While the employment law mandates discussed in sections II through V above are 
mandates predominantly directed to employees as a whole rather than to any discrete subgroup 
of employees, other employment law mandates are targeted to particular demographic 
subgroups.  Indeed, many employment law mandates – including certain aspects of employment 
 
15 Note that although the primary focus of the empirical literature on health insurance mandates is on 
outcomes other than overall wage and employment levels, insofar as overall wage and employment levels 
are concerned, the framework described in section I.A above may require some adjustment when 
analyzing the effects of health insurance mandates.  This is so because the cost of health insurance is 
likely to vary with the number of employees rather than, as depicted in Figure 1 above, with the number 
of total worker-hours; in other words, the distribution of worker-hours over employees may matter greatly 
in the health insurance context.  Cutler and Madrian (1998) offer further discussion of this point.   
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discrimination law as well as employment law rules such as mandated workplace leave 
(emphasized below) – are targeted in this way.  The direct effects of these targeted mandates will 
be felt primarily or exclusively by demographic subgroups of employees, such as individuals 
with disabilities, women, or members of particular racial groups, rather than by employees as a 
whole (Gruber 1994a). 
  Of course, no benefits mandate may be entirely untargeted; many mandates, including at 
least some of those discussed above, may tend to benefit some demographic groups within a 
given employment market more than others within this market.  Thus, the difference between 
general and targeted mandates is probably best viewed as a difference in degree rather than a 
difference in kind.  
  The importance of distinguishing between general and targeted mandates arises from the 
fact that the subgroups to which targeted mandates are directed are generally groups whose 
wages and employment opportunities are legally required to match those of the nontargeted 
employees.  In the absence of such requirements (or if such requirements were not binding),
16 the 
targeted subgroup could simply be treated as a separate labor market, and the same basic sort of 
analysis as was discussed in sections II through V above would continue to apply.  However, in 
the presence of binding restrictions on differential treatment across groups, the analysis of 
targeted mandates proves to be quite different from the analysis employed until this point in the 
paper.  As described more fully below, employment law mandates targeted to demographic 
subgroups of employees constitute an important exception to the general focus in this paper on 
market failures as a necessary condition for employment law regulation to enhance employee 
welfare.  If the goal of a targeted mandate is to enhance the welfare of targeted employees – as it 
 
16 More precisely, if restrictions on wage differentials between the two groups were not binding.  See Jolls 
(2000) for further discussion.  
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often is – then the desired result may obtain wholly apart from any sort of market failure – a 
point obscured by the common focus in the literature on the standard mandated benefits 
framework even when analyzing targeted mandates.
17  In light of this observation, and for the 
sake of analytic clarity, the present section will analyze targeted mandates on the assumption of 
no market failure of any sort.  The analysis below could readily be adjusted to incorporate 
market failure in combination with a targeted rather than general mandate.  As above, empirical 
analysis follows the theoretical analysis. 
 
A.  Theoretical analysis of targeted mandates 
  With a targeted mandate and no market failure of any sort, labor supply with the mandate 
in place will shift exclusively or disproportionately for the targeted employees, rather than (as in 
section I.A above) for employees as a whole.  Meanwhile, on the employer side, the total 
marginal revenue product of labor (reflecting, among other things, the cost of the mandated 
benefit) will shift exclusively or disproportionately for the targeted group.  If, for instance, 
employers are legally required to provide leave from work following the birth of a child, as they 
are in many countries, then both the willingness to supply labor and the total marginal revenue 
product of labor are likely to shift disproportionately for female employees.
18  
Because of the differential effects of a targeted mandate across groups of employees, it is 
important for purposes of the analysis of such mandates to separate out two distinct labor 
markets: the market for employees targeted by the mandate and the market for the remaining 
 
17 See Jolls (2000) for further discussion of this point. 
18 For expositional ease, the analysis below will assume that the mandated benefit has value only to the 
targeted group and imposes costs only in connection with that group.  However, the conclusions offered 
below would remain qualitatively uncharged if the mandate had some value beyond the targeted group 
(although less than the value to the targeted group); the same is true if the mandate imposed some cost 
beyond the targeted group (although less than the cost for the targeted group).  
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employees.  Each market will have its own labor supply and demand functions (although, as 
described below, the demand functions will end up being the same if restrictions on wage and 
employment differentials are binding).  And, because the demand for employees of one type 
will depend, among other things, on the demand for employees of the other type, it will no 
longer be possible to represent everything of interest on a single, two-dimensional labor supply 
and demand diagram, as in Figure 1.   
The following notation will be used below: 
Et = employment level of targeted employees;  
Wt = wage level of targeted employees;  
En = employment level of nontargeted employees;  
Wn = wage level of nontargeted employees;  
C (> 0) = per-worker-hour cost of providing mandated benefit to targeted employees; 
V = per-worker-hour value of mandated benefit to targeted employees; 
MRPL = per-worker-hour marginal revenue product of labor from production. 
 
Prior to the imposition of a targeted mandate, the wages earned by targeted and 
nontargeted employees will be given by Wt = Wn = MRPL(Et + En).  Meanwhile, labor supply 
for the two groups of employees prior to the imposition of a targeted mandate may be written as 
follows: 
Et = St(Wt) 
En = Sn(Wn) 
 
Let (Wt°, Wn°, Et°, En°) with Et° > 0 and En° > 0 denote an interior solution to this system.  
After the imposition of a targeted mandate, labor supply for the two groups of employees 
will be given by the following equations: 
Et = St(Wt  +   V ) ;            ( 1 )  
En = Sn(Wn) .             ( 2 )  
However, labor demand after the imposition of the mandate will depend on the degree to which 
restrictions on wage and employment differentials are binding.  One possibility is that  
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restrictions on wage differentials are not binding (and restrictions on employment differentials 
are or are not binding); in this case, as noted above, a targeted mandate may be analyzed within 
the basic type of framework used in sections II through V above.
19  A second possibility is that 
restrictions on wage differentials are binding while restrictions on employment differentials are 
not; in this case targeted employees will effectively be more expensive to employ (as they must 
earn the same wage but cost the employer more), and employers will thus tend to reduce their 
hiring of targeted employees.  The most interesting possibility, and the one that will be 
examined in the remainder of this section, occurs when restrictions on both wage and 
employment differentials are binding.  In this case there must not be any difference between the 
wages or employment opportunities of targeted and nontargeted employees within a given 
employment market; employers must pay each type of employee the same wage and must 
demand each type in proportion to its willingness to supply labor at that wage.  
   With binding restrictions on wage and employment differentials, the common wage W 
for the two groups of employees after the imposition of the mandate will be given by:  
W = [Et/(Et + En)][MRPL(Et + En) – C] + [En/(Et + En)]MRPL(Et + En). 
Rewriting: 
W = MRPL(Et + En) – [Et/(Et + En)]C.        (3) 
The equation in (3), together with the labor supply equations in (1) and (2), yields a system of 
three equations in three unknowns; let (W*, Et*, En*) denote a solution to this system. 
As (3) shows, a targeted mandate will affect labor demand both as a result of the 
mandate’s effect on MRPL through changes in Et + En and as a result of the direct cost C of the 
mandated benefit.  With respect to the former effect, it is straightforward to show that because 
 
19 See Jolls (2000) for further discussion.  
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of the downward pressure on labor demand as a result of the cost of the mandated benefit, the 
employment level of nontargeted employees will fall with the mandate:  En* < En°.
20  
Intuitively, the mandate, by requiring employers to incur costs for targeted employees that 
nontargeted employees will have to share as a consequence of the binding restrictions on wage 
and employment differentials, induces marginal nontargeted employees to exit the market.  This 
relationship between En* and En° in turn allows one to depict the effects of a targeted mandate 
on the wages and employment of targeted employees in simple graphical form in a figure 
(Figure 2) similar to Figure 1 from above.   
In Figure 2, the curve Dt° is the pre-mandate labor demand curve for targeted employees 
at the pre-mandate equilibrium level of nontargeted employment (En°).  Thus, the curve Dt° is 
given by W = MRPL(Et + En°).  Meanwhile, the curve Dt' is given by the following equation: 
 W = MRPL(Et + En°) – [Et/(Et + En*)]C.         
The curve Dt' thus depicts the effect of the shift due to the cost of the mandated benefit after the 
mandate is imposed; the MRPL term is ignored by assuming that the marginal revenue product 
of labor from production as a function of targeted employment (Et) is the same pre-and post-
mandate (MRPL(Et + En°) in both cases).  Because, as noted above, En* < En°, it is 
straightforward to see that the ultimate post-mandate labor demand curve for targeted 
employees, with En = En*, must lie above the curve Dt' in Figure 2. 
We are now in a position to assess the effects of a targeted mandate on the wages and 
employment levels of targeted employees.  As the discussion in section I.A above suggests, it is 
useful to separate the analysis into distinct cases based on the relationship between the value 
and the cost of the mandated benefit.  The straightforward case is the one in which the value of 
 
20 See Jolls (2000) for details.  
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the mandated benefit equals or exceeds its cost.
21  In this case, not surprisingly, the targeted 
employees’ wage will fall by less than the value of the mandated benefit, while their 
employment level will rise, as depicted in Figure 2. 
The more interesting case is the one in which the value of the mandated benefit is less 
than its cost.  In this case it is no longer certain that targeted employees will be better off after 
the mandate is imposed, but it remains likely; as long as the fraction of nontargeted individuals 
in the qualified population is not too small, and the gap between the value and the cost of the 
mandated benefit is not too large, a targeted mandate will always make targeted employees 
better off.  If, for example, nontargeted employees constitute the vast majority of the 
employment market in question, then the fall in the total marginal revenue product of labor for 
all employees in that market with the imposition of a targeted mandate will be small, as the 
average cost of the mandated benefit across the employment market will be small.  And the 
smaller the downward shift in the total marginal revenue product of labor as a result of the 
mandated benefit cost, the smaller the gap between the curves Dt° and Dt' in Figure 2, and hence 
the lower the likelihood that this gap will exceed the downward shift in the labor supply curve 
(St° to St').  As long as the downward shift in the labor supply curve equals or exceeds the gap 
between Dt° and Dt' over the relevant range of employment levels, the wage of targeted 
employees will fall by less than the value of the mandated benefit, while their employment level 
will rise. 
 
21 In the absence of any market failure – the assumption maintained throughout this section – a benefit 
whose value equals or exceeds its cost might, but conceivably would not, be provided in the absence of a 
mandate.  Because the benefit accrues exclusively or disproportionately to targeted employees, it seems 
possible that the benefit would not be provided (with binding restrictions on wage and employment 




                                                
Thus, targeted mandates may be justifiable on distributive grounds even when the cost of 
the mandated benefit exceeds its value.
22  In the case of general mandates, by contrast, 
distributive considerations cannot justify legal intervention when the cost of the mandated 
benefit exceeds its value because, as noted in section I.A above, the employees’ wage will fall 
by more than the value of the benefit to them.  This effect occurs because there is no other group 
to whom to shift costs.  But with targeted mandates, even if the value of the mandated benefit is 
less than its cost, the mandate may make targeted employees better off because nontargeted 
employees will bear some of the associated cost. 
The point about potential distributive gains wholly apart from market failure is especially 
important because the fact that the value of a mandated benefit is less than its cost may reflect 
precisely the undesirable distributive situation that employment law seeks to remedy.  The 
reason is that “value” in this framework is measured by employees’ willingness to pay for the 
benefit by accepting lower wages, and the distributive situation of targeted employees might 
preclude them from accepting lower wages (see generally Dworkin 1980).  If, for instance, a 
mandate requires employers to provide medical leave to employees with serious medical 
problems, the value (measured by willingness to pay) of this benefit to the targeted employees 
may be limited not by the utility of the leave to these employees but by their financial position.  






22 Of course, distributive goals might alternatively be achieved through a tax-and-transfer regime (Kaplow 
and Shavell 1994).  
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B.  Empirical analysis of targeted mandates 
As suggested above, some targeted mandates arise under employment discrimination law 
and, for that reason, are not analyzed further in this paper.
23  The primary employment law 
application of the analysis of targeted mandates is workplace leave mandates, which at least in 
the United States arise under employment law outside of what is generally considered 
employment discrimination law.
24  Workplace leave mandates in the United States 
disproportionately target both disabled employees (through mandated entitlement to medical 
leave) and female employees (through mandated entitlement to leave following the birth of a 
child).
25  These two aspects of mandated workplace leave are considered in turn below.
26 
 
1.  Mandated  medical  leave      
As noted above, the wage and employment effects of a targeted mandate depend 
significantly on the degree to which restrictions on wage and employment differentials between 
targeted and nontargeted employees are binding.  Starting with restrictions on wage differentials, 
such restrictions are likely to be binding in the absence of significant occupational segregation 
 
23 Disability discrimination law, for instance, requires employers to make “reasonable accommodations” 
for disabling conditions – a mandate targeted to employees with disabilities (Acemoglu and Angrist 
2001).  Similarly, to the extent that sex discrimination law requires health insurance coverage of 
maternity-related medical costs, it imposes a mandate targeted to female employees (Gruber 1994a) 
24 The Family and Medical Leave Act, which requires employers to provide employees with leave from 
work under specified conditions, is not part of any of the employment discrimination statutes in the 
United States and is administered by the Department of Labor rather than the agency (the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission) that administers employment discrimination statutes. 
25 Mandated leave following the birth of a child is targeted to female employees even though leave is 
typically available to male employees because female employees who have biological children will 
require at least a brief period of time off from work after a birth to recover from the temporary disability 
associated with giving birth and, thus, will almost certainly (for purely biological reasons) be more likely 
than male employees to take leave.     
26 Another targeted mandate in the United States is the Mental Health Parity Act, which requires that 
coverage of mental and physical conditions under health insurance plans be comparable in certain 
respects.  Because this law is generally believed to be of modest practical impact, it seems unlikely to be 
the source of observable empirical effects.  
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between targeted and nontargeted groups.  Legal restrictions on wage differentials are generally 
fairly easy to enforce (e.g., Posner 1987), and, moreover, employers may have incentives to 
adhere to norms of pay equity wholly apart from legal restrictions because of the potential 
morale problems that can result from inequity in wages between different groups performing the 
same work.   
In the case of mandated entitlement to medical leave, the group of employees 
disproportionately (though of course not exclusively) targeted by such a mandate is employees 
with disabilities, some of whom will be significantly more likely to require leave than 
nondisabled employees.  With respect to occupational segregation, at least in the United States 
employees with disabilities are not significantly segregated, so restrictions on wage differentials 
between employees with and without disabilities are likely to bind. 
Likewise, with respect to restrictions on employment differentials, while these 
restrictions are unlikely to bind directly for employees with and without disabilities because of 
the difficulty of enforcing such restrictions (e.g., Posner 1987), the ultimate effect may be the 
same in analyzing mandated entitlement to medical leave because many of the conditions for 
which such leave will be required are unobservable to employers at the time of hiring and, thus, 
cannot be the basis of differential employment decisions (Jolls 2006).  In this case, the analysis 
in section VI.A above predicts that mandated entitlement to medical leave will increase both 
wages and employment levels of employees with disabilities, unless either the fraction of 
targeted individuals in the qualified population is too large or the cost of the leave significantly 
exceeds its value.  In the United States, because medical leave under the Family and Medical 
Leave Act (FMLA) is unpaid, it seems unlikely that the cost of this benefit significantly exceeds 
its value.  
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A straightforward empirical measure of the wage and employment effects of mandated 
entitlement to medical leave under the FMLA on employees with disabilities is a comparison of 
wages and employment levels of such individuals before and after the FMLA went into effect – 
ideally with an additional comparison between states in which mandated entitlement to medical 
leave under the FMLA was an innovation and those in which it was not.  Both approaches 
suggest neutral to positive effects of mandated entitlement to medical leave on disabled 
employment levels (relative to nondisabled employment levels), with the most credible evidence 
suggesting positive effects (Jolls 2006).  This evidence underlines the prospects for positive 
effects of targeted mandates on the employment opportunities of targeted employees, consistent 
with the theoretical analysis offered in section VI.A above.   
 
2.  Mandated leave following the birth of a child 
As noted above, relatively limited degrees of occupational segregation (as in the case of 
employees with and without disabilities in the United States) suggest that restrictions on wage 
differentials will be binding.  But in the case of male and female employees – the groups likely 
to be disparately affected by mandated entitlement to leave following the birth of a child – 
employment markets remain quite segregated.
27  With substantial occupational segregation, 
restrictions on wage differentials will tend to be of little force because the only comparisons that 
are drawn in the law are those between employees within the same employment market (or, more 
technically, those performing the same or similar work).  As noted above, in the absence of 
 
27 See chapter 25 (by Blau and Kahn) in the Handbook of Labor Economics for further discussion of 
occupational segregation by sex.  
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binding restrictions on wage differentials, an analysis similar to that used in sections II through V 
above remains applicable to the case of a targeted mandate.
28 
Mandated entitlement to leave from work following the birth of a child exists in a wide 
array of countries and has been extensively studied.  Waldfogel (1999), for instance, examines 
female employees’ wages and employment levels in the aftermath of the FMLA’s enactment in 
the United States and finds no consistent pattern of statistically significant results.  The lack of 
clear results may stem in part from the fact that, as Waldfogel notes, many female employees 
were entitled (by state legislation or firm policy) to FMLA-type benefits following the birth of a 
child even prior to the FMLA’s enactment.   
Another test of the effects of mandated entitlement to leave following the birth of a child 
comes from looking at the effects of European leave laws.  Ruhm (1998), for instance, finds that 
the length of the leave period under these laws generally is negatively related to the wages of 
female employees and positively related to their employment levels.  Note that because 
employees’ leave is paid, in contrast to the situation under the FMLA, positive employment 
effects are more likely under the European laws, which are presumably valued more by 
employees than the FMLA because of the paid nature of the leave.  (Negative labor demand 
effects of paid leave are blunted by government rather than employer financing of the leave.)  
An exception to the general pattern of Ruhm’s findings is that the effect of having some 
mandated leave versus none – as distinguished from the effect of having a short mandated leave 
versus a long mandated leave – has no statistically significant effect (rather than a statistically 
significant negative effect) on wages of female employees.  This may result from the fact that a 
 
28 Of course, very few employment markets are actually perfectly segregated, so that there is absolutely 
no opportunity to compare targeted and nontargeted employees’ wage levels.  Jolls (2000) provides 
further discussion of the reasons that markets with significant segregation are nonetheless most naturally 
modeled as markets in which restrictions on wage differentials are not binding.  
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short leave, as opposed to a long leave, imposes relatively few costs on employers, and thus 
provides little occasion for a wage adjustment.
29  
Overall, the empirical evidence on mandated entitlement to leave following the birth of a 
child suggests neutral to positive employment effects – the same broad pattern as with mandated 
entitlements to medical leave.  Wage effects, by contrast, appear more negative with mandated 
leave after the birth of a child – a likely consequence of the degree of occupational segregation 
by sex.  Note, however, that because sex (in contrast to many medical conditions) is easily 
observable to employers, decreasing occupational segregation by sex over time is more likely to 
generate job losses from mandated entitlement to leave following the birth of a child (as wage 
adjustments are precluded by decreased segregation) than to produce the benefits for targeted 
employees that may come from mandated entitlement to medical leave. 
 
VII.  Wrongful Discharge Laws 
  One of the most fundamental issues in employment law involves the general conditions 
under which employers may engage in “the industrial equivalent of capital punishment” by 
discharging an employee.
30  In many countries, a pervasive set of laws limits the conditions 
under which employees may be discharged without attendant legal obligations (e.g., Blau and 
Kahn 1999).  In the United States, by contrast, a sharply different approach prevails; an 
employee may generally be fired at any time, without identification of any reason whatsoever for 
the discharge and without any attendant employer obligations, unless either the employee’s 
 
29 An important subtlety in discerning the effects of mandated entitlement to leave following the birth of 
a child is that, as Waldfogel (1998, 1999) emphasizes, such mandates may have a sort of composition 
effect, moving female employees into, or keeping them in, better, higher-level jobs.  If this is so, then the 
aggregate effects of the mandates may be more mixed and more complex than the effects suggested by 
the theoretical framework described above. 
30 The quoted phrase comes from Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401 (1981).  
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contract specifically provides otherwise or the discharge reflects unlawful discrimination or 
some other unusually arbitrary or abusive basis for decision (Kim 1997).  Only one of the fifty 
United States (Montana) departs from this regime of “at will” employment.  The United States 
does have an unemployment insurance system, which is a limited form of employment protection 
and is discussed in the next section, but (outside of Montana) there is no general requirement that 
employers offer any sort of justification when discharging an employee and no general set of 
employer financial obligations attending such discharges.
31 
The issue of the scope of wrongful discharge laws – defined for purposes of this paper as 
laws requiring a threshold level of justification before employers may discharge employees – 
does not fit well within the framework described in section I.A above because, in contrast with 
the legal rules discussed in the preceding sections, the legal regulation here is directly linked to 
the employment level.  (In the case of the legal rules governing workplace safety, workplace 
privacy, and various types of employee benefits such as health insurance and workplace leave, 
the rules affect the wage and employment levels only indirectly through the shifts in labor supply 
and marginal revenue product of labor they will produce.)  The analysis below first provides 
theoretical discussion of the labor market effects and the efficiency of wrongful discharge laws; 
it then notes evidence from empirical studies of these laws. 
 
A.  Theoretical analysis of wrongful discharge laws 
  1.  Labor market effects of wrongful discharge laws 
In general, wrongful discharge laws have competing potential effects on the employment 
level.  On the one hand, they potentially increase employment because they impose barriers to 
 
31 For further discussion of current law governing discharge from employment in the United States, see 
Kim (1997).  
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firing.  On the other hand, these very barriers may discourage the hiring of employees in the first 
place.  Models of these types of competing effects are discussed in chapter 25 (by Blau and 
Kahn) in the Handbook of Labor Economics, and the reader is referred to that volume for further 
discussion of the theoretical analysis of the labor market effects of various forms of employment 
protection law. 
 
2.  Efficiency analysis of wrongful discharge laws 
At least in theory, several market failures may justify legal rules requiring a threshold 




  a.  Employee-side  information  failures 
The most straightforward justification for wrongful discharge laws is that in the absence 
of such laws, inadequate employee-side information about the ability of an employer to 
discharge employees without offering an adequate justification for the discharge leads employees 
to oversupply labor at a given wage rate.  Empirical evidence on this form of market failure is 
discussed in section VII.B below.   
If, in the absence of wrongful discharge laws, many employees incorrectly believe that 
they can only be discharged after a threshold level of justification has been met, then wrongful 
discharge laws can improve both employee welfare and efficiency by eliminating the gap 
between employees’ observed and “true” willingness to supply labor.  With a wrongful discharge 
law in place, the governing regime is consistent with employees’ belief – although of course in 
 




the real world the mandated level of justification for discharge may not match employees’ 
beliefs, or its imposition may impose very large costs.  As described below, the available 
empirical evidence on employee-side information failure in the wrongful discharge context – 
while strongly supportive of the existence of such information failure – does not allow any 
inference about whether existing wrongful discharge laws are ultimately a welfare-enhancing 
response to employee-side information failure in this context. 
 
b.  Employer-side information failures 
  Alongside employee-side information failure, Levine (1991) develops the argument that 
employer-side information failures may also justify wrongful discharge laws.  Intuitively, an 
individual employer may not offer wrongful discharge protection on its own, even if such 
protection, adopted universally, would increase both efficiency and employee welfare, because 
the individual employer who offers the protection may become a magnet for less desirable 
employees.   
  In Levine’s model, employees are of two different types, and discharge occurs either on 
an at will basis – where employers need not provide any reason for discharge – or on a “just 
cause” basis – where employers must prove employee malfeasance in order to justify a 
discharge.  Note that, by contrast to the focus in sections II through VI above on models in which 
employees are paid in accordance with the marginal revenue product of labor, Levine’s model is 
a species of efficiency-wage model, in which employees may earn rents in order to discourage 
shirking.  Levine shows that a single firm may not profit from adopting just cause when its 
competitors do not adopt it, even if such an approach, adopted universally, would be efficiency- 
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increasing.  Because of the phenomenon of adverse selection, a mandated just cause requirement 
may enhance both efficiency and employee welfare. 
 
B.  Empirical analysis of wrongful discharge laws 
  1.  Labor market effects of wrongful discharge laws 
The evidence on the labor market effects of various forms of employment protection law 
is discussed in chapter 25 (by Blau and Kahn) in the Handbook of Labor Economics.  In 
addition, in the time since this volume of the Handbook of Labor Economics was published, 
studies by Miles (2000), Autor (2003), and Autor, Donohue and Schwab (2006) have further 
examined the wage and employment effects of wrongful discharge laws in the United States.  
Both Miles (2000) and Autor (2003) find a significant positive relationship between more 
restrictive wrongful discharge laws and the substitution of temporary for regular employees.  
Meanwhile, Autor, Donohue and Schwab (2006) find negative employment effects of some, 
though not all, types of wrongful discharge laws. 
 
2.  Efficiency analysis of wrongful discharge laws 
The available empirical evidence on the efficiency of wrongful discharge laws bears most 
strongly on the first potential market failure discussed above – employee-side information 
failure.  Kim (1997, 1999) presents evidence that most individuals in the United States are not 
aware of the fact that employers need not meet some threshold level of justification in order to 
discharge their employees.  Kim surveyed a total of 921 recently discharged employees at 
unemployment benefits offices in California, Missouri, and New York in the late 1990s.  To file 
a claim for unemployment benefits, claimants in these states must appear in person at a benefits  
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office.  In Kim’s study, claimants were approached while waiting for assistance at benefits 
offices and asked if they would complete a written survey.  Presumably because the claimants 
were already waiting and did not have the option to be elsewhere, response rates were high – 
85% in California and Missouri and 69% in New York. 
The surveys in Kim’s study asked respondents to consider specific scenarios in which 
individuals were discharged without a good reason and then to indicate whether they believed 
such discharges would be found to be lawful by a court of law.  For instance, one question asked 
about the lawfulness of a termination based upon personal dislike of the employee; another asked 
whether it was lawful to terminate an employee based on a mistaken belief that the employee had 
stolen money (a belief that the employee could prove was incorrect).  While such discharges are 
unquestionably permitted under the law in the United States (outside of Montana), the vast 
majority of respondents believed that the discharges were unlawful.  Table 1 below summarizes 
Kim’s main findings.   
One issue with Kim’s findings is whether unemployment insurance claimants are 
representative of the overall employee population in the United States.  On the one hand, as Kim 
notes, individuals who recently lost their jobs may be more likely than the average employee to 
have some familiarity with the legal regime governing discharge, precisely because of their 
recent experience with being discharged.  In addition, because eligibility for unemployment 
benefits requires both that the claimant have some prior attachment to the labor market (in the 
form of a minimum number of weeks employed) and that the claimant undertake an active search 
for new employment, claimants’ beliefs should provide a good measure of what a job seeker with 
labor market experience knows at the moment at which a decision is made about accepting a job 
offer from a particular employer.  On the other hand, unemployment benefits claimants may be  
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less informed than the average employee about the legal rules governing termination because 
those who are better informed – and thus realize that they have no legal protection against 
discharge without an adequate justification – may better protect themselves from involuntary 
termination.  Balancing these various factors, there does not appear to be a strong a priori reason 
to believe that unemployment benefits claimants will be systematically less aware than other 
employees of the United States rule of at will employment, thought only additional empirical 
study can definitively resolve the question. 
Note that because unemployment benefits claimants are disproportionately individuals 
who earned low to moderate, rather than high, wages prior to their discharge from employment, 
Kim’s evidence bears most directly on the existence of employee-side information failure in 
employment markets other than those involving highly compensated employees.  However, Kim 
finds that erroneous beliefs about the legal rules governing discharge are common regardless of 
education level.  In Missouri, for instance, respondents with college degrees still exhibited 
strongly mistaken beliefs about the legal rules governing discharge (Kim 1997). 
Kim’s findings suggest that employees often do not have good information about the 
United States rule of at-will employment.  While in some search models a limited proportion of 
informed actors may eliminate the effects of information failure in markets (e.g., Wilde and 
Schwartz 1979), Kim’s evidence suggests that the proportion of United States employees 
suffering from information failure is extremely large.  While the empirical support for employee-
side information failure is thus large, it is, as noted above, not clear exactly what legal reform 
would bring the treatment of discharge in the United States in line with employees’ expectations 




VIII.  Unemployment Insurance Systems 
Unemployment insurance, briefly noted in the preceding section, is an extremely 
common, although limited, form of employment protection.  Unemployment insurance requires 
the payment of benefits in lieu of wages upon discharge from employment, typically (at least in 
the United States) without regard for the reason for the discharge except in extreme 
circumstances.  Under the United States system, benefits are financed by a payroll tax that 
employers must pay on a per-employee basis. 
Both theory and evidence relating to unemployment insurance are developed at length in 
chapters 13 (by Atkinson) and 33 (by Krueger and Meyer) of the Handbook of Public 
Economics, and, thus, the reader is referred to that volume for further discussion of the 
economics of unemployment insurance.  In brief, Krueger and Meyer, in the more recent of the 
two chapters, conclude that the empirical evidence suggests longer periods out of work with 
more generous unemployment insurance benefits – a finding, like its counterpart in the workers’ 
compensation context from section III above, with ambiguous welfare consequences. 
 
IX. Minimum  Wage  Rules 
  Among the most extensively discussed rules within the economic analysis of employment 
law are minimum wage rules.  Under these rules, employers must pay a legally-specified 
minimum wage to employees.  An important opening observation about these rules is that, akin 
to the analysis in section VI above, the usual role of market failure in justifying employment law 
rules is altered.  Even in the absence of market failure, a minimum wage rule may increase total 
employee income and, thus, at least by this measure, may enhance employee welfare.  
 
44 
  For minimum wage rules to increase not only total employee income but also efficiency 
and the income of each individual worker, market failure is necessary.  It is often observed in 
discussions of minimum wage rules that market failure in the form of monopsony may justify 
such rules.  This is so because, as discussed in section I.B above, under monopsony the wage is 
set below the marginal revenue product of labor.  Anything that moves the wage closer to the 
marginal revenue product of labor will both enhance efficiency and make all employees better 
off. 
Both theory and evidence relating to minimum wage rules are developed in chapter 32 
(by Charles Brown) in the Handbook of Labor Economics, and the reader is referred to that 
volume for further discussion of these rules and their effects on efficiency and employee welfare.   
 
X.  Overtime Pay Requirements 
The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) in the United States imposes both minimum wage 
rules – discussed in the preceding section – and overtime pay requirements, which are the focus 
of the present section.  Under overtime pay requirements, employers are legally required to pay a 
wage premium for hours above a specified weekly or other threshold.  In the United States, 
employers generally must pay one and a half times the normal wage for hours worked above 40 
hours per week.  This section describes both theoretical and empirical analysis of overtime pay 
requirements 
 
A.  Theoretical analysis of overtime pay requirements 
  Overtime pay requirements, like the employment law rules discussed in the preceding 
sections, represent a legally prescribed term in the employment relationship.  However, there is  
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an important analytic difference between overtime pay requirements and the rules considered in 
all of the preceding sections.  In the case of overtime pay requirements, the legally prescribed 
term simply concerns the form within which dollars are paid to an employee, rather than some 
other aspect (such as the safety, privacy, or wage level) of the job.  In principle, then, it may be 
possible for employers to undo completely the effects of overtime pay requirements (Ehrenberg 
and Schumann 1982, pp. 36-37).  To borrow Trejo’s (1991) example, suppose that in the absence 
of overtime pay regulation, an employee works 50 hours per week and earns $11 per hour.  The 
employer in this circumstance could satisfy the FLSA by reducing the employee’s straight-time 
wage to $10 per hour and then paying time and a half for the 10 hours in excess of the 40-hour-
per-week cutoff.  The employee would be in an identical situation, working 50 hours per week 
for $550 in pay.  By contrast, when, for instance, a particular workplace safety mandate is put 
into effect, employers in the new equilibrium must provide the new safety feature (possibly 
compensated by lower wages) and cannot directly replicate the prior equilibrium. 
Of course, there are limits on the foregoing account of the undoing of overtime pay 
requirements.  To the extent that straight-time wages are at least somewhat sticky, employers 
may not be able to adjust such wages continuously over time in response to the number of 
desired overtime hours.  In addition, adjustment will be either impossible or limited for 
employees whose straight-time wages are at or near the legal minimum wage level prior to any 
requirement of overtime pay.  Both of these points are emphasized by Trejo (1991).  Ultimately, 
then, empirical evidence is necessary to determine whether the theoretical account of the 
irrelevance of overtime pay requirements is true in practice. 
To the extent that overtime pay requirements are not completely undone – as a result of 
various forms of wage stickiness or other factors – is there a market failure to which overtime  
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pay requirements might be thought to be responsive?  The conventional view is that intensive use 
of a smaller set of employees, instead of reliance on a broader group of employees, has a 
negative externality effect on those individuals who are unable to obtain employment when a 
smaller group of employees is used intensively.  To the extent that overtime pay requirements 
increase employment levels to some degree, it is possible that these requirements represent an 
effective response to the negative externality just noted. 
 
B.  Empirical analysis of overtime pay requirements 
In an effort to determine whether overtime pay requirements are effectively undone by 
changes in base wages, Trejo (1991) studies differences in base wages across employees covered 
and not covered by the overtime pay requirements of the FLSA.  The noncovered employees 
used in Trejo’s analyses – who are comparable to covered employees in being paid on an hourly 
basis – include nonsupervisory agricultural workers, many transportation employees, and certain 
retail and services employees.  (The largest group of employees not covered by the overtime pay 
requirements are employees who are paid on a salary rather than an hourly basis, but these 
individuals would, for obvious reasons, provide a weak control group for examining the effects 
of overtime pay requirements on covered, hourly wage employees.)  Using a sample of repeated 
cross sections, Trejo finds that the hourly wages of covered employees are significantly lower 
than the hourly wages of noncovered employees.  According to Trejo, this evidence provides 
some suggestion that overtime pay requirements are partially, although not completely, undone 
by adjustments in straight-time wages.  Potential limits on Trejo’s empirical analysis include the 
fact that the results are somewhat sensitive to the measure of wages used (with weekly earnings 
yielding results different from those just described) and the limited degree of identification  
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resulting from possible unobservable differences across individuals in hourly wage jobs within 
covered versus noncovered sectors.  In contrast to Trejo, Hunt (1999), examining evidence from 
Germany, finds increases rather than decreases in wages in response to strengthened overtime 
pay requirements negotiated between unions (which are industry-wide in Germany) and 
employers; wages may well be less flexible in Europe than in the United States.  Hunt’s 
identification strategy has the virtue of employing both cross sectional and time series variation. 
In addition to examination of whether base wages adjust to offset overtime pay 
requirements, empirical work has directly studied the linked question of whether workweeks 
longer than 40 hours in the United States are less frequent with overtime pay requirements in 
place.  (Only with imperfect wage adjustments should such workweeks be less frequent with 
overtime pay requirements in place.)  Costa (2000) examines changes in the frequency of 
overtime hours with the passage of the FLSA and finds a significant reduction in the proportion 
of employees working such hours.  Costa also finds much greater reduction in the South – in 
which more employees were at the minimum wage level and, thus, could not be subjected to 
wage adjustments in response to overtime pay requirements – than in the North.  By contrast, 
Trejo (2003), using as a source of identification variation over the 1970s and 1980s in the 
proportion of employees within an industry who are subject to the overtime pay requirements of 
the FLSA, finds no effect of overtime pay requirements on the frequency of workweeks longer 
than 40 hours in specifications that include industry time trends.  However, as Trejo notes, the 
coefficients on coverage changes are imprecisely estimated, making it difficult to discern 
whether the absence of a statistically significant effect suggests no underlying effect or simply 
the limited power of the empirical approach.  Hamermesh and Trejo (2000) study not the FLSA 
but a California state law expanding the set of employees covered by a strict form of overtime  
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pay and find significant negative effects on the level of overtime employees work.  None of these 
studies, however, offers any evidence that, in response to a decline in long work hours, aggregate 
employment rises in the employment market in question – although it is obvious that a decline in 
workweeks longer than 40 hours is a logical predicate for such an increase.  Using German data 
and examining the effects of industry-specific changes in overtime pay requirements, Hunt 
(1999) finds that, if anything, aggregate employment levels fall rather than rise in response to 
strengthened overtime pay requirements. 
 
XI. Conclusion 
  This paper has offered economic analysis (or, at times, referred to economic analysis in 
the Handbook of Labor Economics or the Handbook of Public Economics) of the major topics in 
employment law.  Topics addressed above include workplace safety mandates (section II), 
compensation for workplace injuries (section III), workplace privacy mandates (section IV), 
fringe benefits mandates (section V), targeted benefits such as mandated medical and family 
leave (section VI), wrongful discharge laws (section VII), unemployment insurance (section 
VIII), minimum wage rules (section IX), and overtime pay requirements (section X).
33  There 
remains much interesting work to be done on many of these topics, including the effects of some 
of the relatively new laws mentioned above.  Moreover, while the focus of most existing 
employment law is on mandating particular features within the employer-employee relationship, 
recent legal scholarship in employment law has given increased emphasis to prospects for using 
“default” rather than mandatory rules.  Relatively unexplored in existing work is theoretical and 
empirical analysis of the effects of default versus mandatory rules in the regulation of the 
 
33 A separate area of inquiry concerns the causes (rather than the desirability and the effects) of 
employment law rules.  This question is analyzed by Botero et al. (2004).  
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employment relationships.  In this and other areas, there are important potential future synergies 
between legal scholarship on employment law and economic analysis of this body of law. 
  As noted above, this paper has focused on employment law rather than labor law.  
However, it bears emphasis that the two fields of law do not operate in any way independently of 
one another.  The contours of labor law, in affecting the prevalence and power of unions, may 
greatly affect what sorts of employment law rules are enacted and, perhaps most importantly, the 
degree to which employment law rules are effectively enforced against employers.
34  With 
respect to the importance of enforcement, it is difficult to disagree with Pound (1910, pp. 16, 34-
35), who noted long ago that employment law “in action” may look quite different from 
employment law “on the books.” 
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Table 1: Employees’ Knowledge of Legal Rules Governing Discharge 
    
Reason for Discharge  State  Legal Rule: 
Discharge is 





      
California Legal  81.3% 
Missouri Legal  82.2% 
Employer plans to hire 
another person to do the same 
job at a lower wage  New York  Legal  86.1% 
      
California Legal  80.9% 
Missouri Legal  79.2% 
Retaliation for reporting theft 
by another employee to 
supervisor New  York  Legal  81.8% 
      
California Legal  82.7% 
Missouri Legal  89.4% 
Mistaken belief that employee 
stole money (employee can 
prove mistake)  New York  Legal  91.6% 
      
California Legal  88.1% 
Missouri Legal  91.7% 
Personal dislike of employee 
New York  Legal  90.6% 


















  Notes:  Employees are assumed to be demanded and paid 
in accordance with their marginal revenue product of labor 
(rather than, for example, earning efficiency wages), and 
the mandated benefit is assumed to be a variable-cost 
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Notes:  Employees are assumed to be demanded and paid in 
accordance with their marginal revenue product of labor 
(rather than, for example, earning efficiency wages), and the 
mandated benefit is assumed to be a variable-cost rather than a 
fixed-cost one. 
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